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Sex Discrimination in Employment Under
Title IX
Section 901 of Title IX1 of the Education Amendments of
1972 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in educational
programs receiving federal financial aid. The basic prohibition of
the statute is broadly worded.' Although it clearly intends to pro-
hibit sex discrimination by schools against students in admissions
procedures and in decisions regarding awards of federal financial
aid, a controversy has arisen over whether Congress intended this
provision to apply as well to the employment practices s of the
schools receiving aid.
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
("HEW"),4 pursuant to section 902 of the Act,5 promulgated regu-
I Education Amendments of 1972 §§ 901-907, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
2 "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1976). Exceptions to the section limit its applicability to institutions of vocational educa-
tion, professional education, graduate higher education, and public undergraduate schools,
and exclude the following from the section's operation: institutions in the process of chang-
ing from single-sex to coeducational admissions (for no more than seven years); educational
institutions controlled by religious organizations whose tenets are inconsistent with the sec-
tion; military academies; public undergraduate schools with a tradition of single-sex admis-
sions; social fraternities and sororities; youth organizations traditionally open to a single sex;
father-son and mother-daughter activities (so long as comparable activities are provided for
children of the other sex); and financial assistance given as a result of successful competition
in beauty pageants. Id.
3 The scope of this comment is limited to employment practices affecting professional
employees, as opposed to nonprofessional staff. Although the language of section 901 is not
so limited, there is some evidence in the legislative history that Congress considered only
professional employees to be covered. See, e.g., 118 CONG. Ruc. 5807 (1972) (remarks of
Senator Bayh). The issue of who constitutes a professional employee, as well as whether
only full-time employees or also part-time or adjunct faculty members are protected by the
Act, is unresolved. Because all of the cases that have arisen so far have involved full-time
faculty members, however, this comment does not attempt to resolve these issues. One pos-
sible solution would be to follow the comment's suggestion that the regulations be rewritten
to refer only to specific programs receiving federal funds. At that time, the range of employ-
ees covered could also be defined.
As of May 4, 1980, all of the duties of HEW in the area of education were assumed by
the newly created Department of Education, which reissued HEW's employment regula-
tions, see note 6 infra, in identical form at 45 Fed. Reg. 30802 (1980) (to be codified in 34
C.F.R. §§ 106.51-.61). Recent suits have named the Department of Education as defendant
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lations to implement Title IX.6 HEW determined that section 901
covered employment; consequently, the agency issued specific reg-
ulations governing employment practices.7 Since the regulations
were issued, several schools have challenged HEW's interference
with an area of their administration over which, they say, the Act
and HEW have no control. Four courts of appeals have agreed with
the schools, declaring the regulations invalid on the ground that
Congress intended Title IX to protect only students and that,
therefore, HEW exceeded its authority by issuing the employment
regulations.8
In July of 1980, the Second9 and Fifth10 Circuits disagreed."
Both courts held that section 901 authorized HEW to issue regula-
tions regarding employment, but even they differed over the scope
of this power. This comment analyzes these cases, examines the
legislative history of Title IX, and concludes that section 901 au-
thorizes HEW to regulate employment practices, but that the
agency must limit the effect of its regulations to specific programs
that receive federal financial aid.
I. HISTORY OF THE ACT
Both the courts that have declared HEW's regulations invalid
and those that have ruled that the agency had authority to issue
them have found the language of the statute inconclusive and have
in place of HEW. Because the functions and the regulations of the two departments are
identical, this comment will refer to HEW as the agency involved for the sake of correspon-
dence with the legislative history and the majority of the cases.
5 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
6 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1-.61 (1979).
Id. §§ 86.51-.61.
8 Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 563 (1981);
Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972 (1979). Only the Islesboro court undertook any detailed analysis of the problem; all of
the other courts expressly followed it. See also Board of Educ. v. HEW, 19 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 457 (N.D. Ohio 1979); University of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio
1979); Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65
GEo. L.J. 49 (1976).
' North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufatedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49
U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986).
0 Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1023).
11 See also Salomone, Title IX and Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Search
of a Remedy, 9 J.L. & EDUc. 433 (1980) (disagreeing with the first four courts of appeals
decisions, but antedating the Second and Fifth Circuit opinions).
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resorted to congressional debates to support their holdings. In or-
der to understand both the cases and the controversy, a brief reca-
pitulation of the history of the Act is necessary.
Initially, the House and the Senate each passed its own ver-
sion of the Education Amendments of 1971.12 The houses could not
agree on the form the bill should take, so the Senate referred the
dispute to its Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which re-
solved the differences and recommended passage of the House ver-
sion with some amendments. 18 Both houses agreed to the compro-
mise version in 1972, and the bill was enacted into law. The
language of section 901 that became law corresponds closely to the
versions originally introduced in both houses.14 Consequently, ref-
erence to all the debates gives valid insight into the congressional
intent behind the section.
Two structural elements of Title IX are important to an un-
derstanding of this congressional intent. First, in writing Title IX,
both houses relied on the structure and language of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,15 which banned discrimination on the ba-
ses of race, color, religion, and national origin in programs receiv-
ing federal aid. Section 901, in fact, is an almost verbatim repeti-
tion of section 601 of Title VI.1S
Second, both the original House and Senate versions of Title
IX included amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196417 and to the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
22 The Senate first passed its bill on August 6, 1971. S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117
CONG. Rac. 30500 (1971). The House passed its bill on November 4, 1971, H.R. 7248, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 39353-54 (1971); the House then substituted its language
for the Senate version and passed the bill in that form. 117 CoNG. REc. 39374 (1971).
13 S. CoNF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Seass., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2608. Most of the amendments concerned provisions of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 other than Title IX. Id. at 221, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2608, 2671. The Title IX disputes between the House and Senate had to do primarily
with the exceptions to section 901. Id.
14 Compare H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 39098 (1971) (here num-
bered Title X) with S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 30399 (1971) (first Senate
version, here numbered Title VI) and S. 659, 92d Cong., 2d Seass., 118 CoNG. REc. 5803
(1972) (second Senate version, here numbered Title X). See also S. CoNF. REP. No. 798, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 221, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2608, 2671.
15 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601-605, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1976).
16 Id. § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). That provision states: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance." Section 901 simply substitutes "on the basis of
sex" for the criteria of race, color, and national origin listed in section 601. See note 2 supra.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II
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Act 18 ("Equal Pay Act"), adding a prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex to those statutes. The drafters included
these provisions in section 906 of Title IX, but before the Educa-
tion Amendments were passed, the alteration to Title VII was ef-
fected by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.19 The
amendment to the Equal Pay Act was enacted as section
906(b)(1). 20
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
With regard to the question of Congress's intent, the legisla-
tive history of Title IX is ambiguous. Both groups of courts-those
deciding that Congress did not intend section 901 to cover employ-
ment, and those deciding that it did-relied on the language of the
statute and some of the same portions of the legislative record for
their contrary conclusions. But an analysis of the legislative history
reveals that the weight of the evidence indicates congressional in-
tent to regulate employment through section 901.
A. Statutory Language
The First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee v. Califano21
held that the language of section 901, "on its face, is aimed at the
beneficiaries of the federal monies. '12 By beneficiaries, the court
meant students enrolled in schools receiving federal aid or teachers
receiving research grants23 from the government.24 From this, the
court inferred a congressional intent to exclude employees from
the Act's coverage.
1978).
18 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
19 Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2-3, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a), 2000e-1
(1976)).
20 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(1), 86 Stat. 375 (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1976)).
593 F.2d 424 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
"Id. at 426. Accord, Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119, 121 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). But see North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler,
629 F.2d 773, 777-78 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981)
(No. 80-986); Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737-38 (5th Cir.), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1023). See also Board of
Edue. v. HEW, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 457 (N.D. Ohio 1979); University of Toledo v.
HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
:3 That is, teachers qua students, not qua employees.
24 593 F.2d at 426.
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Neither in its basic prohibition nor in its exceptions, however,
does the statute expressly exclude employees from its protection.
One can make a strong contrary argument that they are implicitly
embraced within the broad language of section 901. In addition to
language that clearly refers to students, 5 section 901 also requires
that no person shall "be subjected to discrimination under" any
federally funded educational program.2" It is plausible that this
language, which is much broader in scope than the language refer-
ring to students alone, was calculated to cover those employees
whose jobs are funded by federal dollars. Moreover, Congress used
the all-inclusive words "no person" to designate the protected
class. If, as the Islesboro court suggested, a more circumscribed
class was intended, Congress easily could have substituted "stu-
dent" or Islesboro's own word, "beneficiary," to restrict the scope
of the statute's protection.
In order to support their contention that the section refers
only to beneficiaries, some courts have pointed out that none of
the exceptions listed in section 90127 refers to employees or em-
ployment practices.28 The argument is that because the exceptions
apply only to aspects of education that affect students, they reflect
the limits Congress intended to place on the scope of the basic pro-
hibition.29 That the exceptions do not mention employment, how-
ever, shows only that employment is not specifically excluded. The
exceptions cannot be construed as limiting the coverage of the Act
to students.30 If anything, in light of the broad scope of the basic
25 "No person. . . shall ... be excluded from participation in, [or] be denied the bene-
fits of ... " Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976); see note 2
supra.
28 Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976); see note 2 supra.
27 See note 2 supra.
28 Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 583-84 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The legislative history is to the contrary on this point. See 118
CONG. REc. 5812 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); text and notes at notes 41-42 infra.
29 The Islesboro court, for example, notes that the exceptions "all deal with student
admissions or activities of a student nature" and that section 901 therefore cannot be con-
strued to apply to "employees qua employees." 593 F.2d at 426.
11 Indeed, two of the exceptions--those sections exempting religious-controlled institu-
tions and military organizations-never mention students or admissions, but recognize that
these types of schools have valid reasons for generally excluding one sex or the other. It is
quite easy to understand that in these two situations, an exemption from section 901 should
be created for both admissions and employment. In contrast, in the situations described in
exemptions such as that for public undergraduate schools with a history of single-sex admis-
sions, there is no reasonable explanation for excluding faculty members of one sex; hence,
such exemptions specifically apply only to admissions. In fact, Senator Bayh suggested that
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prohibition, the absence of a specific exclusion supports the argu-
ment that the Act covers employment.
It is possible, therefore, to read the language of section 901 as
embracing employees. Because it nowhere specifically excludes
them, the most that can be deduced from the face of section 901
regarding employment is that it is inconclusive. One must look,
therefore, to the legislative history for additional evidence of Con-
gress's intent.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history reflects in three ways an intent to in-
clude employment within the embrace of section 901. First, the de-
bates contain numerous remarks pertaining to employment.8 1 Al-
though some of these remarks can be attributed to the early
inclusion in Title IX of amendments to Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act,3 2 others give evidence of a more general aim to have sec-
tion 901 cover employment. Second, the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, in creating a compromise version of Title IX,3s re-
moved a provision from the House bill that expressly exempted
employment from the Act's coverage. The concurrence by both
houses in the deletion of this provision supports the inference that
Congress intended employment to be covered. Finally, after Title
IX was enacted, HEW's regulations construing section 901 as em-
bracing employment were approved by Congress, after remarks
made at the hearings reflected an understanding that the regula-
tions implemented congressional intent. Subsequent attempts to
amend section 901 to exclude employment have failed.
1. Debates. One argument for excluding employment from
the scope of Title IX relies on the inclusion in the original bill of
amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act." That argument
admits the existence in the legislative history of references seem-
ingly indicating that Title IX covers employment. It explains them
the exceptions do just that. See 118 CONG. Rec. 5812-13 (remarks of Sen. Bayh); text and
notes at notes 41-42 infra.
' The debates are cited throughout this comment because they are the only evidence
of legislative intent. The reports, on the rare occasion when they mention employment, are
inconclusive because of the existence of the proposed amendments to Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. See, e.g., H.R. PrP. No. 554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 52, 251, reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 2462, 2511-12, 2590.
" See text and notes at notes 17-20 supra.
See text and notes at notes 12-16 supra.
3, See text and notes at notes 17-20 supra.
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all away, however, as referring only to the proposed amendments
to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.3 5
Several passages from the debates belie this conclusion. For
example, when Senator Bayh reintroduced the bill in 1972,3' he en-
tered into the record a prepared statement explaining the scope of
the proposed statute. 7 In this summary he divided the bill into its
basic areas of coverage, two of which were entitled "Prohibition of
Sex Discrimination in Federally Funded Education Programs"
-the Title VI counterpart that now includes section 901-and
"Prohibition of Education-Related Employment Discrimina-
tion"-the revisions to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
Under the first of these headings, Senator Bayh spoke not
only of admissions and scholarships, but also of employment in
federally funded schools. He noted the close relation between this
portion of his bill and Title VI, and he mentioned the exceptions
to the basic prohibition that this portion allows. Both of these
statements indicate that he was speaking of what is now section
901. Nowhere under this heading did Senator Bayh mention Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act, 8 yet he declared, "[t]his portion of the
amendment covers discrimination in all areas where abuse has
11 See Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 427-28 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). Islesboro notes that according to Senator Bayh, Title IX
applied to three areas of discrimination: admissions and services, both of which affect stu-
dents, and hiring, which affects employees. Id. at 427. Because the portions of the bill
amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act remedied employment discrimination, the Isles-
boro court assumed that they were the only sections of the bill that so applied and that all
references to employment pertained to those provisions. Id. at 428; accord, Romeo Commu-
nity Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). All that
the court cites as support, however, are sections of the legislative history where Senator
Bayh specifically referred to the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 593 F.2d
at 427-28. These remarks prove only that those portions of the bill affected employment;
they give no insight about what was intended by the portion that is now section 901.
3' When Senator Bayh first introduced the forerunner of section 901 in 1971, it did not
come to a vote because it was ruled not germane to the pending bill that it sought to amend.
117 CONG. REC. 30415 (1971).
37 118 CONG. Ruc. 5806-08 (1972).
'8 One inconsistency must be noted. Senator Bayh prefaced his remarks to this section
of his summary by referring to sections "1001-1005." Id. at 5807. Section 1005 contained the
proposed revision to Title VII. See id. Three reasons indicate, however, that the inclusion of
section 1005 in his opening remarks was a mistake: first, Senator Bayh did not also list at
that time the sections revising the Equal Pay Act; second, in his explanation of the coverage
of the mentioned sections he never discussed the Title VII amendments; and third, he dis-
cussed the Title VII amendments at length under the other heading. See North Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Hufatedler, 629 F.2d 773, 781 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W.
3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986).
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been mentioned-employment practices for faculty and adminis-
trators, scholarship aid, admissions, access to programs within the
institution such as vocational education classes, and so forth." 9 All
of Senator Bayh's references to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
come under the heading especially devoted to them. There is no
mistaking that this prepared statement by the sponsor of the bill
indicates an intent to establish in section 901 a broad-based prohi-
bition against employment discrimination.40
This intent is further demonstrated in a colloquy between
Senator Bayh and Senator Pell regarding the scope of section 901
and its exceptions. Senator Bayh explained that the exceptions to
the basic prohibition applied only to admissions procedures in cer-
tain types of institutions. "In the case of employment," he empha-
sized, "we permit no exceptions. 4 1 In fact, this declaration was
something of an overstatement. Senator Bayh went on to note that
religious and military organizations were exempted from the opera-
tion of section 901 not only for admissions but for employment of
teachers as well.42 These explanations of the intended scope of sec-
tion 901 demonstrate that its prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of sex was thought to extend to employment. 43
Debates in the House similarly indicate an intent to include
employment within the reach of section 901. For example, the re-
marks of Representative Erlenborn when he proposed to amend
the House bill reflect an assumption that the bill forbade sex dis-
crimination in employment. Erlenborn stated that the only aspect
of Title IX his amendment changed was the exemption of under-
39 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added).
40 The Islesboro court cited another summary of the bill that Senator Bayh read into
the record, see 118 CONG. REc. 5808 (1972), as further proof of its view that Title IX could
be broken down into portions affecting only students and portions affecting only employees.
The summary to which it referred divides the bill into sections, three of which are entitled
"Basic Prohibition," "Employment Discrimination," and "Equal Pay for Professional
Women." The "Basic Prohibition" section contains a truncated version of the language of
section 901 and its exceptions, the "Employment Discrimination" section contains a sum-
mary of the proposed amendments to Title VII, and the "Equal Pay" section summarizes
the amendments to the Equal Pay Act. The court concluded from this summary that only
the latter two sections of the bill apply to employment. 593 F.2d at 428. This conclusion is
incorrect because the summary the court cited is only an abbreviated version of the actual
language of the bill rather than commentary on the bill; therefore, it sheds no more light on
the problem than does the statute itself.
" 118 CONG. REc. 5812 (1972).
12 Id. at 5813.
"' Accord, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 782 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986).
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graduate admissions. "My amendment would allow the effects of
nondiscrimination in this title to apply to faculty, to employees,
and to admissions practices in the graduate schools so that the en-
try to the professions would be protected . . .. "
This position was echoed by Representative Smith, who said
that the Erlenborn amendment would "leave the prohibition
against sex discrimination to apply to graduate'education and
faculty employment and salaries. 45 In addition, Representative
Quie reflected the same disposition when he introduced his amend-
ment providing that the bill should require no quotas.46 Although
there was considerable debate regarding these and other amend-
ments, no one ever questioned the initial assumption that the basic
prohibition of the bill applied to employment. These remarks are
all the more conclusive when one considers that they were made
while the bill still contained a clause stating expressly that the
statute would not cover employment. 47
A letter from Senator Bayh to Senator Pell, responding to an
inquiry from Professor Julian Levi of the University of Chicago
about the bill's effect on university hiring practices, offers addi-
tional evidence of congressional intent. Professor Levi had written
after the proposed amendment to Title VII was removed from Ti-
tle IX because of its inclusion in the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972, but before Title IX became law. Senator Bayh's
response indicated that one of the primary purposes of Title
IX-even in the absence of the Title VII provision-was to pro-
hibit sex discrimination against professional employees in educa-
tional institutions.48
2. Exemption of Employment in the House Version. The
second aspect of the legislative history that reflects an intent to
include employment within the scope of Title IX is the removal
from the House version of the bill of a provision expressly exempt-
ing employment.49 This section did not appear in the Senate bills, 50
44 117 CONG. REc. 39260 (1971).
45 Id. at 39255.
46 Id. at 39262.
"7 See text and notes at notes 49-56 infra.
48 118 CONG. REC. 18437 (1972).
49 Section 904 of the original House version of Title IX stated: "Nothing contained in
this title shall be construed to authorize action under this title by any department or agency
with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor
organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to pro-
vide employment." H.R. 7258, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 39365 (1971). The sec-
tion paralleled and was modeled after section 604 of Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964
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nor was it a part of the version of Title IX that became law. There
were no debates in the House regarding the provision, nor were
there in the Senate when it disapproved the House version. The
conference report implies that the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare recommended removal of the provision-without comment
regarding its reasons51-and that the House made no effort to re-
tain the section. The report simply states that with regard to that
provision, "[t]he House recedes." 2
Courts have argued that, given the early existence in Title IX
of the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, the re-
moval of this clause was only for the sake of consistency with those
provisions. This reasoning maintains that the initial inclusion of
the clause demonstrates an aim to exempt employment from the
scope of section 901, in exact correspondence with Title VI after
which the bill was modeled.53 Such an argument is easily refuted,
however. There is no evidence in the legislative history that a de-
sire to avoid inconsistency was the motive for removing the clause.
Moreover, the debates in which the House legislators expressed
their belief that the bill covered employment5 reveal no percep-
tion of inconsistency. In fact, these debates point more strongly to
a complete lack of awareness that the employment exemption sec-
tion existed.
A more plausible explanation for the section's original inclu-
sion is that it was mistakenly inserted by the original drafters who
were tracking the language of the model bill, Title VI.5 5 The com-
mittee, the first to notice its presence, probably recommended its
deletion because it was contrary to the purpose of section 901. This
explanation comports with the lack of discussion about the provi-
§ 604, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). In fact, it was because section 601, the counterpart to the
broad prohibition of section 901, was interpreted by some as embracing employment, that
section 604 was enacted. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 778 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986); Kuhn, supra
note 8, at 53-54.
5 See S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 30500 (1971); S. 659, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972).
51 S. CoNF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2608, 2671-72.
52 Id., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2608, 2672.
1 Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 428 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
See text and notes at notes 44-47 supra.
"See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986).
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sion in either house and the willingness of the House to recede on
the point without argument.
Furthermore, the houses voted on removal of the provision af-
ter the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act pro-
voked the deletion from Title IX of the amendments to Title VII.
Although the amendment to the Equal Pay Act remained, it was a
very small part of Title IX. If the legislators had wanted to make
clear that only the equal pay provision, and not section 901, ap-
plied to employment, they could have expressly limited the effect
of the employment exemption section to Title IX's broad
prohibition.5 6
There is additional evidence that bolsters this view. In a sum-
mary of the final version of the bill that Senator Bayh published in
the Congressional Record after the enactment of Title IX, a foot-
note explained the difference between Title VI and Title IX. This
note states explicitly that Title IX does not parallel the Title VI
exemption for employment. 57
3. Postenactment Evidence of Congress's Intent. After Title
IX was enacted, further indications of congressional intent ap-
peared. First, HEW promulgated regulations that included stric-
tures on employment practices. Although Congress had an oppor-
tunity to disapprove of the regulations, it declined to do so; hence,
the regulations became valid. 8 Second, at hearings on the regula-
tions, both Representative Mink and Senator Bayh stated specifi-
See id. at 783.
17 The note states:
Apart from admission coverage ... the Higher Education Act differs from Title
VI in that the sex discrimination prohibition is limited to federally assisted education
programs and activities, whereas the race, color and national origin discrimination
prohibitions are applicable to all federally assisted programs. Title VI also specifically
excludes employment from coverage (except where the primary objective of the federal
aid is to provide employment). There is no similar exemption for employment in the
sex discrimination provisions relating to federally assisted education programs.
118 CONG. REc. 24684 n.1 (1972) (emphasis in original).
By congressional decree, this inaction is not entitled to any weight, one way or the
other, in a judicial proceeding. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976); see Salomone, supra note 11,
at 443. As the North Haven court noted, however, this statute was enacted after the regula-
tions issued under Title IX became valid. Moreover, the subsequent refusal of Congress to
adopt amendments excluding employment from the scope of section 901 adds further sup-
port for the conclusion that coverage was intended. 629 F.2d at 784; see NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
It should also be noted here that, according to a frequently employed canon of statutory
interpretation, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary an agency's under-
standing of the scope of its statutorily delegated powers generally is given considerable
weight. See, e.g., id. at 274-75; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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cally that the regulations implemented the intent of Congress to
prohibit discrimination in employment."e Although these retro-
spective statements cannot be conclusive,60 they are persuasive
when read in light of the other legislative history. Third, some leg-
islators subsequently attempted to amend Title IX by expressly
removing employment from the reach of section 901.1 All such at-
tempts failed. Finally, Congress has amended Title IX to overrule
HEW's interpretations of the statute on two occasions.6 2 Its failure
to take those opportunities to deal with the employment issue as
well lends further support to the inference that it never desired to
do so.6 s
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There are two policy arguments for reading section 901 to ex-
clude employment. The first is that allowing HEW to terminate
funds because of employment discrimination would result in injury
to the students enrolled in those programs. The argument main-
tains that it would not be fair to force students to suffer for the
sake of eradicating discrimination against teachers; therefore, Con-
gress could not have intended section 901 to apply to
employment."
This argument is perhaps emotionally appealing, but it is su-
perficial. In section 902, Congress gave HEW the authority to ter-
minate funds to an entire program to the temporary detriment of
all students, even in the case where only a small minority of stu-
dents have been victims of discrimination. 5 That innocent and
uninvolved students can be made to suffer temporarily by HEW's
59 Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 164, 173
(1975).
60 See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986); Salomone, supra note 11, at
442-43.
61 S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2657, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
62 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(8) (1976) (exempting father-son and mother-daughter activities
at educational institutions); id. § 1681(a)(9) (exempting awards granted to winners of beauty
pageants). See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986).
63 See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986).
"Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 972 (1979).
65 Education Amendments of 1972 § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
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termination of funds is a necessary evil of the statute; therein lies
its potency.
Congress could not have been unaware of these ramifications
of Title IX;ee Title VI had been in effect for several years before
Title IX was considered, and Congress consciously duplicated the
force and remedy of that statute.7 In so doing, it expressed the
hope that HEW would use its power wisely and sparingly, but it
recognized as necessary the leverage that the power to terminate
funds would give HEW against recalcitrant schools.68 The prospect
of fund termination not only for discrimination against students,
but also for discrimination against teachers, makes Title IX all the
more effective against sex discrimination."
The second policy argument is that Title IX was never in-
tended to cover employment because it would then have over-
lapped with the jurisdiction of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 0
In effect, however, there is only a partial overlap. While a private
right of action has been found to exist under all three acts7 1 there
are differences in the remedies available under each. 2 Employees
may sue individually under both Title VIPs and the Equal Pay
Act 74 for such remedies as reinstatement and back pay. It is only
under Title IX that Congress has granted to HEW the potential to
cut off a school's federal funds for violating the statute's prohibi-
'0 Indeed, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress was aware of the impact
that the termination-of-funds remedy would have on students. See text and notes at notes
67-69 infra.
67 E.g., 117 CONG. REc. 30408 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 118 CONG. REC. 5807
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); see Salomone, supra note 11, at 434.
" 117 CoNG. REc. 30408 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); see North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1981) (No. 80-986).
"' See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986); Salomone, supra note 11, at
447.
7o See Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979). But see North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784-85
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986); Salomone,
supra note 11; Comment, The Regulation of Title IX: Sex Discrimination in Student Af-
fairs, 13 Hous. L. REv. 734, 737-39 (1976).
71 Title VII and the Equal Pay Act expressly grant private rights of action. See notes
73-74 infra. An implied private right of action under Title IX was recognized only recently
by the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979).
71 See Salomone, supra note 11, at 439.
73 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
74 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
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tion against sex discrimination. 8 Both the individual remedies and
the system-wide one are important to the overall scheme of eradi-
cating sex discrimination.
Moreover, even if the effects of the statutes overlap, this is not
a reason for failing to implement the congressional intent ex-
pressed in Title IX. Overlapping jurisdiction in the area of employ-
ment discrimination is widely recognized.7 7 In addition, Title IX,
like other antidiscrimination laws, is a remedial statute and there-
fore should be construed liberally in order to implement its correc-
tive purposes.
IV. A NECESSARY LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF HEW's
REGULATIONS
Although the preceding analysis compels the conclusion that
Congress fitended section 901 to cover employment, it does not
necessarily follow that HEW's broad regulations are valid. HEW
has taken the approach that any discrimination within a school
system receiving federal funds gives it the power to terminate
funds to the whole system, regardless of whether the program re-
ceiving the funds itself discriminates.78 HEW's regulations accord-
ingly are written to monitor all employment practices of schools
receiving any federal aid, instead of being limited to the specific
programs within the school that actually receive the funds."' Such
an interpretation of the agency's power is contrary to the language
of section 902, to the intention of Congress, and to rational policy
considerations.
The language of section 902 of the statute unambiguously
states that HEW's rulemaking authority is limited to the particu-
lar program or activity receiving federal aid.80 Just as the prohibi-
71 Education Amendments of 1972 § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
76 See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986); Salomone, supra note 11,
at 439; Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimi-
nation in Public Schools, 53 TEx. L. REv. 103, 120-21 (1974).
77 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-986); see Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
47-49 (1974).
78 See Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1023); Islesboro School Comm.
v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
7" See 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979).
80 Section 902 states:
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tion of section 901 is keyed to "any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance,""1 so by the plain language
of the enabling statute must the regulations govern only the pro-
gram receiving federal aid.2
The Second Circuit, in North Haven Board of Education v.
Hufstedler,83 distinguished in dicta the question of fund termina-
tion from the issue of the agency's regulations. It maintained that
although section 902 limited HEW's ability to terminate funds to
the specific program in which discrimination occurred, nothing so
restricted its rulemaking authority." This distinction makes no
sense, however. There is no reason why HEW's rulemaking author-
ity should be any broader than its enforcement power. The North
Haven court's reading of the statute would enable HEW to regu-
late a school's entire employment system, even though it could
only cut off funds to the programs that received federal aid. Such a
result would be erroneous for several reasons.
First, the power to regulate so broadly could enable HEW to
harass schools and threaten termination of their funds without
having to link the discrimination with the federal funding until
much later in the enforcement process.8 5 Given the drastic implica-
tions of a cutoff of funds, HEW's power should be limited to only
those programs that both receive the aid and unlawfully discrimi-
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any education program or activity,... is authorized and directed to ef-
fectuate the provisions of section 901 with respect to such program or activity by issu-
ing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken.
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (emphasis added).
This comment does not address the much-debated question of what constitutes a pro-
gram or activity for the sake of enforcement of Titles VI and IX. For discussion of this
issue, see Comment, HEW's Regulations Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Ray. 133; Note, Administrative Cutoff of Fed-
eral Funding Under Title VI: A Proposed Interpretation of "Program," 52 IND. L.J. 651
(1977); Note, Title VI, Title IX and the Private University: Defining "Recipient" and
"Program or Part Thereof," 78 MicH. L. Rzv. 608 (1980).
Si 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
82 See Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737 (5th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1023); Romeo Community
Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
83 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No.
80-986).
1, Id. at 785-86; see Salomone, supra note 11, at 439 n.28. But see Comment, supra
note 80.
"I See Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979).
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nate.86 Second, such expansive power to regulate cannot legiti-
mately be granted to HEW. By the language of section 902, HEW
has not even the power to regulate a program funded by another
federal agency, 7 much less a program not funded at all by federal
money. Therefore, the agency logically can have no semblance of
control over an aspect of a school's operation to which it has not
allocated federal funds. Third, HEW's broad regulations would al-
low the inference in every case that discrimination in any area of a
school infects the entire system so that all federal funds to the
school, whether directly linked with the discrimination or not,
should be terminated. Such an inference cannot validly be drawn
except according to the facts of an individual case. Finally, limiting
HEW's enforcement powers to the specific program receiving fed-
eral funds corresponds with the agency enforcement powers
granted under Title VIs and carries out Congress's intent that Ti-
tle IX should be enforced in the same way as Title VI.89
CONCLUSION
The legislative history and the language of section 901 demon-
strate that Congress granted HEW the power to regulate educa-
tional employment practices under that provision. HEW has ex-
ceeded its authority, however, by failing to limit the effects of its
regulations to specific programs receiving federal funds. Although
Congress's purpose in establishing Title IX and in vesting strong
enforcement powers in HEW was to eradicate swiftly the effects of
sex discrimination, the agency must amend its regulations to stay
within the scope of its statutory mandate.
Lynda Guild Simpson
"See Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 49 U.S.L.W. 2569 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 23, 1981).
But see Salomone, supra note 11, at 446 (so limiting HEWs power would unduly restrict
Title IX's coverage to a narrow set of employment situations).
£7 See note 80 supra.
" Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) (enforcement);
compare 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) (judicial review).
8£ 117 CONG. REc. 30408 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); see Salomone, supra note 11, at
